We demonstrate an intuitive relation between conditional entropy and conditional expectation that is useful when one want to compare them as measurement tools to evaluate secrecy systems. In particular, we give a Security Property applicable to general vector variables in , using measurement based on vector quadratic distance, and we show that one can derive variables that can be measured with Csiszàr and Körner secrecy capacity measurement [2], based on conditional entropy, with conserving the same order relation.
I. Introduction
When considering communication systems in which three entities , and receive respectively a random variable , , and , it has been an important domain of research to determine under what conditions on the variables , , and the communication system is Information Theoretically secure, meaning that it enables the legitimate partners and to exchange data that remain hidden to the eavesdropping opponent , even if has unlimited computation and storage power.
The first necessary achievement in order to obtain Information Theoretical Security is called Advantage Distillation. It can be intuitively understood as the fact that and obtain variables and that are 'closer' than say and , according to some distance over the sample space.
Csiszàr and Körner have introduced in [2] a measurement, based on conditional entropy, that lowerbounds secrecy capacity , meaning the maximum rate at which and can exchange Information Theoretically secure bits. That lower-bound is:
On the other hand, entropy is not an easy function to manipulate in many contexts, and it appears more natural, typically in the Euclidean space , to measure Advantage between the partners and over the opponent by using the quadratic distance in .
This article gives an equivalence between a measurement of Advantage based on quadratic distance and the Csiszàr and Körner's measurement of Advantage applied to a transformed version of the variables , , and .
II. Presentation and proof of the general result
We consider ‖ ‖ the quadratic distance over the Euclidean space . For :
‖ ‖ ∑
The technical result that we will demonstrate is the following:
For , there exist (i) a set , (ii) an independent random variable taking values in , (iii) a non trivial pre-condition and (iv) a function :
{ }, such that:
Proof of Lemma 1 can be found in Annex 1.
We thus apply the randomized transformation:
It has been shown by Wyner [3] that, for binary random variable (typically being the received bit flows of in a secrecy system), provided that ( ) ⁄ :
Therefore, by noticing that ( ) [ ], we can explicit that in the conditions above, we have the relation:
III. Interest of the result
In a secrecy system, the passive eavesdropping opponent has access only to a set of public information , and then the optimal estimation of by an observer who only knows is of course given by
This variable minimizes
It is therefore a consequence of the above relation that, if the observer does not have access to the optimal estimation variable [ | ] for any reason governed by the Security Model, then we may have:
for any strategy ( ) chosen by the opponent, and thus:
An example of such Security Model where the observer does not have access to the optimal estimation variable [ | ] is Deep Random secrecy [5] , in which it is shown that the absence of full knowledge of probability distribution of by the opponent may be exploited to ensure that the inequality ( ) is strict, thus enabling to obtain strictly positive Secrecy Capacity . Note however that in a secrecy system, the legitimate partner may neither have access to an estimation as accurate as the optimal estimation [ | ], and therefore, when analyzing a secrecy system, the inequality ( ) is not alone a guarantee of security.
In general, it is useful to be able to study Advantage Distillation with to a tool like quadratic distance, that benefits from solid mathematical framework, rather than directly conditional entropy.
Annex -Proof of Lemma 1
Let's first establish the result for : 
and thus the equivalence is immediate.
The proof of the result for is the following:
Let's assume that ‖ ‖ is a public condition , then it is natural to impose as well and . We will denote by the identity matrix of size . For , we consider the isometries:
[ , we consider the functions:
By recurrence, we get: 
